Aristotle's Presuppositions of Predication
by David C. Hewins, revised June 2001 from original of 1981.

1. Introduction

In his early work On Interpretation (in the Organon), Aristotle appears to have taught the view of predication also held, with a different metaphysical foundation, by Plato in the Sophist. This view may, for most purposes, fairly be seen as identical with that required by modern quantificational logic. In his more mature Prior Analytics, Aristotle maintains the view that has come to be associated with the development of his traditional syllogistic.

In this paper I do not intend to investigate or even presuppose a certain kind of historical development in the Aristotelian corpus. I shall simply point out, through exegetical exposition of relevant texts, the doctrine common to the Organon, and that common to the later Prior Analytics, the Topics and the Metaphysics. For convenience I shall call the latter the mature doctrine. What comparison of the two lines of thinking I undertake will be directed towards elucidation of the mature doctrine. I will attempt to show how the substance doctrine of the Metaphysics leads quite naturally to the mature view of predication.

We shall follow Aristotle in calling a spoken or written designator of a subject of predication a name (onoma). Aristotles claim that being inheres most clearly in substance (taken qua primary instance) implies that statements asserting the most general truths must be predications whose subjects are substances. These subjects, represented by names, are for Aristotle the source of being of the referent of the predicate (rhema).

Aristotle's mature metaphysical theory denies that anything can have being in a way not immanent to substance. Case in point: there are no separated forms or universals. It would therefore seem that all predicates must designate substance.

However, for Aristotle, predicates always contain universal terms, and no universal term may designate substance. Insofar as knowledge is only of the universal, how then can any term designate substance? We find the answer in Aristotle's claim that a universal is potential in a singular, and is actual only in a multitude. Predication and judgment are intellectual acts. When any act is brought to consummation it causes motion, that is, a transition from potency to act. Through predication the intellect moves the potential universal in the singular to a state of actuality in a multitude. The question of the locus of this motion must be left for another time.

The consequence for the calculistic or grammatical side of Aristotle's doctrine of predication is that the actual universality--the terminus of the act of judgment--is expressed by the predicate of the proposition. The universal term designates a multitude--a class--and not a substance taken qua primary instance (an individual) or a separated substance (a platonic universal). The class or species is the actual universal, and may be seen to be composed of substances taken qua primary instance only in extension.

2. Roots in the On Interpretation.

At this time I will not attempt to broach the question of the historical development of Aristotle's thought. So I shall sketch his views on predication, from the On Interpretation, with no more than a few critical suggestions.

The On Interpretation begins by making the fundamental distinction between a noun or name (onoma) and a verb (rhema). A name has a significance of its own. But a verb is always a sign of something said of something else, that is, of something either predicable of or present in some other thing (16b10). This means that the verb does not have an independent reference. It is dependent for its signification upon its proximity to a name (16b6) in a sentence. Sentences are the loci of such proximity; the class of propositions is identified from the class of sentences as just those sentences which are either true or false (17a4).

A simple proposition is a statement, with meaning, as to the presence of something in a subject or its absence (17a23). Taken in the context of the entire Organon, this claim appears to mean that a true simple proposition asserts a relationship between a substance qua itself and that substance qua a representative of one of the other categories. The verb and the copula, conjoined to the name in the sentence, are the linguistic tokens or expressions of such a relationship. A thing is universal when its nature is to be predicated of many subjects; it is individual when such is not the case (17a37). A complex proposition is a catena of simple propositions.

It appears that a predication views a subject substance qua itself as well as qua one of the other categories, and consists in the position of the unity of these aspects before the intellect. Plato's doctrine of Ideas is eschewed; in Aristotle's early scenario, all that is needed is orderly application of the categories to the substance by the intellect.

3. The Mature View

In the Prior Analytics, the Metaphysics and the Topics we find a doctrine of predication very different from that obtaining in the On Interpretation. The "proposition" of the latter has become "premiss" here, and is now in the domain of the consequence relation Aristotle calls the syllogism.

"A premiss then is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another. This is either universal or particular or indefinite. By universal I mean the statement that something belongs to all or none of something else; by particular that it belongs to some or not to some or not to all; by indefinite that it does or does not belong, with­out any mark to show whether it is universal or particular..." (Prior Analytics 24a1520)

"That one term should be included in another as in a whole is the same as for the other to be predicated of all of the first. And we say that one term is predicated of all of another, whenever no instance of the subject can be found of which the other term cannot be asserted: 'to be predicated of none' must be understood in the same way." (Prior Analytics 24b2630)

It appears that, on this view, every proposition is to call to our minds two items, one (usually) an individual, the other a class. Any predication is a statement about the membership of the individual in the class.

Where, in the On Interpretation, classes would be defined by the attributes of their members, here predication, including attribution, is defined by the structure of a given class. In the On Interpretation, universality and particularity are to be determined by examining the concrete nature of a thing in order to see whether that nature can be predicated of many subjects; here a panoply of subjects must be given before a universal nature can be identified from them.

In the On Interpretation each proposition concerns an individual (designated by a name) and its attributes (one corresponding to each verb). In the Prior Analytics, each proposition concerns the relationship of its individual subject to a class. Although the class is made up of individuals ontically comparable to the subject, the predicate of the proposition designates that class in essentially the same way in which the name designates the subject: the predicate names the class.

4. The Substance Doctrine

Let us now examine Aristotles substance doctrine, with the goal of understanding his mature view of predication more clearly.

For Aristotle in the Categories, primary substance (the individual) is the basic ontological notion. Everything but primary substance is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance (2a33). 'Present in' might well be rendered in later terminology by 'immanent to'; or, as Aristotle himself puts it, not 'present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject', in this case primary substance (1a22).

Secondary substance--the notion which subsumes essences and genera--are rank-ordered according to their proximity to primary substance (2b7f). In this way genus and species can be said to be substance, but in an oblique way. Nothing may be termed 'substance' except primary substance, genera and species. And, the latter pair alone give knowledge of primary substance (2b30), presumably because they are the ontic locus of attributes taken qua any epistemically useful taxonomy.

Also, as we shall see later, the epistemic primacy of the universal can be maintained correlatively with the ontic primacy of the substance only through such threefold diversity in the sense of 'substance', this diversity being given an order through the introduction of a potency-act distinction in the universal.

Primary substance itself is said never to be predicable of nor present in any subject (2a13). This assertion appears to ensure that predication is a meaningful action: necessity, never contingency, is the locus of meaning for Aristotle, so the present claim posits predication to be an asymmetrical relation requiring, for meaningfulness, at least one nonaccidental relatum (contrary to the theory of the On Interpretation). The passage 2a13 also provides a field of operation for human predicative activity; the presence-in restriction ensures that substance is homogeneous qua itself, and that it cannot, taken qua itself, enter into change; the presence-in restriction also wards off the epistemic intractability that would result if the essential nature of substance devolved upon it through its participation in another substance. In that case (for Aristotle, as opposed to Plato and St. Thomas Aquinas) predication could no longer be said to have a clearly demarcated subject.

What I have called the 'homogeneity' of substance is also asserted in the claim that substance does not vary in degree within itself (3b35, also Metaphysics 1041a5). The primacy of the individual is then emphasized as first substance is said to signify the individual (3b10).

The homogeneity of substance qua substance is for Aristotle the ultimate guarantor that primary substances are signified univocally, and that differentia and secondary substances are predicated univocally in all propositions of which they form the predicate (3a33f). This is confirmed in Metaphysics 1041a5, where no universal term (ton katholou) designates (legomenon) or is said of a substance, and no substance is composed of substances (out' estin ousia oudemia ex ousion) [Footnote 1]. We must note that the former tenet is incompatible with the view of predication expressed in On Interpretation, in which the subject token (name) and the predicate both refer to the same substance under different aspects.

The homogeneity of substance qua substance is also confirmed in On Generation and Corruption, where it is said that contraries which have being in an unqualified sense have, as that which under­lies them qua itself (not qua underlying them) one being which is in all characteristics the same (although its 'actual being' is not the same) (On Gen & Corr, 319b24).

Assertion of any correlation is seen as demanding technical reference, that is, exact designation of the correlated terms (Categories 7b10; Metaphysics 1006a21, 30, 31; 1006b8, 12). Exact designation is univocal, for Aristotle, and one term is used univocally in various occurrences if and only if both instances have both the name (sign) and definition (identification of the essence of the signs referent) in common (Categories 3b7).

Substance qua substance is said to have no contrary (Categories 3b24). If contrariety is here taken with respect to complementation or participation, the claim can be construed as underscoring the fact that since substance is not one of the other categories, nor an accident, it has neither opposite qua those categories nor qua accident.

But this claim would seem to be tautologous. Rather, it seems more to the point to infer from the claim that when a term denoting substance is negated, the negated term has no reference in the real world. All predication demands an underlying substratum (see below), and so do negations. But existence of such a substratum means that the mere fact that a proposition P is negative cannot be construed as denying reference of subjectterms of P to (possibly nonreal) substantial substrata, as we shall see later.

In the Metaphysics it is said that accidental predication implies the definite existence of the underlying substratum (1028a25). This substratum is substance in the truest sense (1029a1), but 'sub­stance' also collectively refers to the essence, the genus and the universal (1028b35).

In distinguishing between essence and substance, Aristotle maintains that definition is the 'formula' of the essence (Metaphysics 1031a14), but that only substance, as opposed to any of the other cate­gories, is definable (1031a1). If this were not the case, then essences would be generated ad infinitum (after the pattern of the Third Man Argument) since a substratum is needed for position of the relation between an essenceasunspecified, for example 'snub nose', and that essenceasspecified, 'the nose of which it is said that it is snub'. (1030b2736, cf. 1031b291032a11.)

Substance is said to be the starting point of everything: syllogisms start with substance; processes of production start with substances (1034a30). This implies that substance is produced only by pre-existing substance. Quality or quantity need not preexist otherwise than potentially (1034b15). The individual is the originative principle of individuals (1071a20).

Reference can be made to privations as well as to beings themselves only because of their relationship to substance taken qua primary instance (1003b611). We may fairly infer that all predications take their truth or falsity from the nature of the subject qua substratum. True predication is recognition of the nature of the subject (Footnote 2).

5. First Link Between Substance and Predication: The Law of Contradiction

Aristotle's discussion of the Law of Contradiction (LC) in Metaphysics book Gamma Chapters Three and Four appears to be one of the most succinct texts that we possess showing his view of the relationship between his metaphysical thought and his doctrines of predication. The section begins with the question whether one science indexes or has as its subject matter both inquiry into axioms (on the side of the knowing subject) and into substance (on the objective side). That is, is there a theoretical bridge between the epistemic and the ontic with respect to substance?

The highest science is that of being qua being: such is the conclusion of Chapter Two (1005a15). Chapter Three opens with the assertion that the axioms of this highest science belong 'to all things and are not proper to some one genus apart from the others' (1005a23). As the axioms representing each genus of being are known and used by students of that genus, so the axioms of being qua being are employed by the philosopher, who studies being qua being (through line 29). The metaphysician as scientist is above the physicist, who even receives from the metaphysician judgments of value as well as of truth and falsity (1005b1).

It appears that Aristotle's argument at this point is an in­duction from the part to the whole. The basis is knowledge of individual beings with concomitant axiomatizations. The induction step is that all knowledge is analogous to that of the basis. The conclusion is that the science of being qua being demands its own axioms.

Axioms of being qua being are tacitly (in this passage, at least) equated with the 'Principles of the syllogism' in line 1005b8. As each genus has its certain principles, so metaphysics must have its certain principles (line 12). The principles of the syllogism, the axioms of being qua being, rest upon that 'about which it is impossible to think falsely' (line 13). This lynchpin of the syllogism is posited as that which 'one must have if he is to understand anything.' It is not an hypothesis. It is 'that which one must know if he is to know anything' and it 'must be in his possession for every occasion' (lines 1517).

It appears that, at this point in his argument, Aristotle simply maintains that LC is the only possible presupposition for the possibility of predication and therefore of knowledge. The spectre of ubiquitous Heraclitean change looms as the alternative (lines 245). For Aristotle, true knowledge is necessary; that is to say, not subject to change.

The argument from line 17 back to line 13 may not seem tight. Why does constant possession of a thing (line 17) imply that it is impossible to think falsely about it (line 13)? An opponent of Aristotle might object at this point that I, as a human individual, constantly possess my skin. I may even say truly that, qua physical being, I move if and only if my skin does. But is the presence and integrity of my skin a necessary presupposition for the possibility of my physical motion? Victims of severe burns clearly respire and even move, at least until they die, as they often do shortly after the injury. The point is that, in the physical realm at least, we rarely find that concomitance implies material identity. We do find that concomitance usually implies simultaneity or coextensivity, as the ordinary rule.

The explanation for Aristotle's thinking here can only be that he takes a material, as opposed to a merely formal, view of logical inference. The formal view, as in modern quantificational logic, maintains that--

(*) X if and only if Y

--such that X and Y are wellformed sentences, says nothing more than that X and Y occur truly only together. No statement is made about the consubstantiality of X and Y, the identity of X or Y or of terms therein, or (necessarily, without further specification in the con­text) the simultaneity of X and Y.

The material view is quite different. Here, the nature of the substances to which reference is made by the terms in a proposition determine the total meaning of the proposition, and a well-formed true proposition is an accurate linguistic representation of certain substances, their attributes and structure. As an instance of the schema (*) we shall take--

1) That being is human if and only if it is a rational animal.

Here, the material view dictates that the left and the right clauses refer to the same species; the left refers to a specific individual in that species, while the right refers to the species as a whole. Predication 1) consists in seeing the individual referent of the left hand side as a member of the class referred to by the right.

We must, however, be careful to remember that for Aristotle, knowledge is not of the individual. Rather, any predication is in the final analysis a statement about a universal. Therefore, a consummated predication concerns an individual qua species member, not an individual qua individual.

The fact that Aristotle is, in an ultimate sense, presupposing and not demonstrating LC is confirmed as Chapter Four opens. If there are some things 'of which one should not seek a demonstration, [the deniers of LC] could not say which of the principles has more claim to be of this kind' (1006a11). LC is for Aristotle the most indisputable of all principles, and is therefore indemonstrable (1006a35).

Aristotle goes on to claim self-consistency for his position. Beginning at line 12, he affirms that any denier of LC can be refuted without being forced to beg the question, if only he will enter into controversy. The question whether a given thing is and is not must not be begged (line 20). Rather, all Aristotle demands is that what the opponent says 'should at least mean something to him as well as to another' (line 21). The possibility of controversy or argument presupposes meaningful predication (line 24). By the results of chapter three, meaningful predication is material. Such predication must therefore have objective, substantial reference. That is, such reference must be apparent to the nonidentical parties to the dispute. Therefore its being or nature must be selfdetermined, not determined by the predicating parties.

'For not to signify one thing is to signify nothing, and if names have no meanings, then discussion with one another, and indeed even with oneself, is eliminated' (1006b712). 'One thing' ('hen' in 'to gar mee hen seemainein') appears again just before line 15: 'a man' signifies not only "kath' henos, alla kai hen" ('but also one'). One what? The English rendering 'thing' here may be acceptable, but raises the question of the coextensivity of 'things' and substances. We may be forced to face this question ourselves, but must first seek further elucidation from the text.

The problem (line 20) 'is not whether the same thing can at the same time be a man and not be a man in name (to onoma), but whether he can be and not be so in fact (to pragma).' Aristotle clearly seems to be speaking of the referents of terms here. He shows clearly that the consequence relation he has in mind is material and not merely formal, by inferring from a distinction between 'a man' and 'not a man' a distinction in their referents (lines 2129). It is only on a material mode of inference that a substantive term can be negated. For example, on this view we can speak of the Greeks and the not-Greeks, the men and the not-men, being and not-being in syntactically equivalent ways. A proposition well-formed with 'men' in the subject position will be equally well-formed (but not necessarily meaningful) with 'not-men' in that slot (contrary to the view of On Interpretation 16a30). Negation is an operator upon terms of the proposition, and not upon propositions taken as wholes.

It is true that in line 24 'to mee einai anthropo' clearly has the negative particle tied to the infinitive instead of the noun. But it seems that in the majority of cases Aristotle ties the negative particle to the substantive term. He codifies this usage in the Prior Analytics (25b21): "'is' makes an affirmation always and in every case, whatever the terms to which it is added in predication, e.g. 'it is not-good' or 'it is not-white' or in a word 'it is not-this'". If the negative particle is viewed as a syntactic operator, its operand is the substantive term, not the proposition taken as a whole, and not even the copula.

It is a consequence of this material view of predication and inference that all terms, even those bound to a negative particle, carry existential import. That is, the referent of 'man' is as real qua predication as the referent of 'not-man' (contrary to On Interpretation 16a30). When reality qua predication is confused with ontic or metaphysical reality, as in modern idealism, adherence to the material mode of inference is seen as demanding position of the equal ultimacy of being and nonbeing (as in Sartre), as well as what amounts to the reification of privation.

So, in general, idealists who do not wish to follow Sartre and his ideological kin behave just as Aristotle predicted in 1007a21: they eliminate substances and essences. When they are asked single questions (line 9) they add also the denials, and so 'are not answering the question'. A subject of predication is completely or exhaustively defined by all its attributes (line 22), so the idealist tries to accomplish the 'impossible' (line 14) task of listing 'an infinite number of accidents' per subject instead of making reference to an essence (line 22). But with such procedure, for Aristotle, argument ceases (line 20).

In 1006b15 we noted the difference between signification "kath' henos" and signification of one (hen). We raised the question 'one what?', inquiring into the precise sense of this occurrence of 'hen'. In line 26, Aristotle explains that "'to be one' means, as in the case of 'a garment' and 'a coat', that their formula is one" (ei ho logos eis). It seems normal in Aristotle to find some equivocation upon the term logos, at least from the point of view of the modern English speaker. We use 'formula' in at least two senses: 1) the baby's formula; 2) that chemical formula on the blackboard. It appears that Aristotle's sense here conforms more to sense 1) above, the sub­stantial sense, than to sense 2), the formal sense. In the substantial sense, if the referents of two terms have the same formula, then those two terms refer to the same substance, taken under different descriptions or qua different attributes. Identity of formula implies identity of reference [Footnote 3]. Only thus can the modus tollens inference, which has as minor premiss line 28 ('But it was shown that they signify distinct things') be valid. Thus it appears that 'one thing' in this context means 'one substance'.

We are now in a position to discuss l007a20 and following. Aristotle insists that the material mode of predication and inference is the only viable one, in the opening line: "In general, those who [deny LC] eliminate substances and essences." For them, essence qua substratum of predication does not exist (line 22), and all things are attributes (sumbebeekoi, line 22). In the final analysis, denial of the existence of any underlying substratum of predication causes predication to go on to infinity ('anangkee ara eis apeiron einai', line 1007b1). Deniers of LC are driven to deny the substratum because they deny the material role of negation (lines 2329). This denies the view of predication as act, by denying that the universal is potential in the individual and actual in the species, as we shall see later. Both the 'to ti een einai' (substance) and the logos formula or substance qua essence (lines 21 and 30, respectively) are acts of to be [Footnote 4]. Any potency is merely a potency-of such an act of to be. Predication will not truly characterize the being-as-act of the primary substance if the predication is itself merely an expression of potency.

In denying that predication can go on to infinity (eis apeiron), Aristotle simply appeals to the observation that 'not even more than two terms are combined in accidental predication' (1007b13). The appeal is not made to limited human powers. It is as if, were it not for the nature of this particular case, an infinite process is within the reach of human beings.

A closer look at this passage reveals that it is rooted in the same noetic presuppositions as is Aristotle's argument for determinate reference in general. On the objective side of the subject-object relation it is clear that Aristotle holds that all being devolves from being qua primary instance, that is, the individual. On the subjective side, however, the apeiron is in both cases immanent to the subject. That is, if predication is not material, then the intellect cognizes an infinite totality. In 1007a15 the totality in question is 'ta sumbebeekota' (the accidents); in 1007a3536 it is predi­cation kath' hupokeimenou. The scenario of the consequent is rejected in 1007a35-36 because linguistic usage must reflect ontic structure. But in 1007a15 the problem is simply one of listing the infinite totality. Such a list is impossible to produce in time. This impossibility is not based upon the limitations of intellectual perception in the passive sense, but upon the limitations of human (including intellectual) acts. Communicable indexing of an infinite totality is impossible to accomplish in time, so any (communicable) index presupposes at best a situation of pros hen equivocity. Reference is, at bottom, made to one object, possibly under diverse aspects. Consequently we have the insistence upon signification of one determinate thing in 1006b712. The case of the finite index reduces (in the most difficult case) to a sequence of pros hen equivocations.

The foregoing view of the apeiron appears to be confirmed in De Anima 429b59, where the mind is said to become its possible objects, and in 430a5, where speculative knowledge (that is, knowledge of nonmaterial, purely intellectual objects) and its objects are said to be identical. The nous pathetikos (passive mind) becomes all things (430a15), while the nous poietikos (creative mind) is characterized by making all things, and so is limited by the various potencies to which it gives form. Actual knowledge is identical with its object (431a1); actual knowledge is prior to the potential. The form is the point of identity between the mind and the object (431b30). The mind is the form of forms and sense is the form of sensible things (loc cit). Insofar as the infinite totality in question is a possible object of the nous pathetikos, it is immanent to the intellect [Footnote 5]. Such immanence is no refutation of nonmaterial predication. Such refutation is rather to be found in the timebound nature of the acts of the nous poietikos; only these render intersubjective interaction possible.

The primacy of the substance qua primary instance is evident in lines 1007b34: "For an accident is not an accident of an accident unless both are accidents of the same thing." This teaching much later became the medieval "ground principle of deduction"--'nota notae est nota rei ipsius' (the note of a note of a thing is a note of the thing itself). If even a potency is a potency-of a subject, surely an accident is an accident-of, also, and all accidents are indexed by their (primary) subjects. Criteria for defining such an index properly are spelled out in lines 516. Taken together, it all implies that substance qua substratum is indispensable if the indexing, and therefore predication, is to obtain (line 18).

6. Second Link Between Substance and Predication: Potency-Act

Here we shall examine Metaphysics Mu (13) section 10. The context for this passage begins with 1087a. Aristotle argues against the platonic hypostatization of the Ideas as separate substances, presenting the problem of finding what we now call Urelemente or atomic substances.

If these elements are individual and not universal they are in one-one correspondence with the real particulars and are not knowable (1086b 2036). If they are individual and are universal (line 37) and the primacy of substance is maintained, then the substances they compose are also universal, contrary to Aristotle's view of the definiteness of substance.

Tension between the definiteness of particulars and the requirements of knowability of universals characterizes the remainder of the passage through the end of Book Mu. We might expand upon 1087a4ff as follows: one definite item is knowable only if it is in some sense universal. But universality resides in the multitude. To make matters worse, (lines 910) the multitude may very well be infinite. An infinite totality presented to the intellect will not be listable and hence will not be communicable. At the very least the universal is indefinite.

A movement towards resolving this tension is seen in equi­vocation upon episteemee and epistamai (line 15). Knowledge is in one sense potential (to dunamei) and in the other actual (to energeia) (line 16). The potential deals with the universal and the indefinite (katholou kai aoristos) in line 17; the actual deals with the concrete this (tode ti, line 18). Actual knowledge is like its object in also being a this.

A presupposition of actual knowledge in time is potential knowledge (1089b1516, cf. De Anima 431a14). So knowledge, potential with respect to the individual, becomes actual only when that individual is recognized qua its species membership. This transition from potency to act is called predication, and the Prior Analytics is an extended effort to work out the details of this view.

7. Summary

The universal is potential in the singular, actual only in the multitude. By Metaphysics 1041a5 no universal term can refer to a substance in its primary sense.

Predication is an act, as is judgment (De Anima 432a10, 433a14f, 434a16f, esp. 21). Every act produces motion, that is, a transition from potency to actuality. The object of predication is the universal, in the final analysis. Motion of this object begins with the universal qua potential in the singular, and ends with the universal qua actual in the multitude.

A remotion argument may suffice to prove that the universal, qua its aspects as stated above, is the only possible object of predication for Aristotle. Because of its hylomorphic concreteness, substance in its primary sense (the individual) is not the object of predication (Metaphysics 1086b32, 1036a9). Neither is any separated entity because, on Aristotle's view, separated universals, Ideas or Forms do not exist. Substance qua its universal aspect or moment is the only viable object of predication remaining.

Substance qua substratum is not designated by universal terms (Metaphysics 1041a5). But in secondary senses, 'substance' may desig­nate the universal and the genus. It is only in this sense that a consummated predication designates substance, producing for the intellect a well-defined class, suitable for use as data for a further syllogism. Only in this way can Aristotles overarching claim obtain: syllogisms start with substance; processes of production start with substances; substance is the starting point of everything ('panton archee hee ousia', Metaphysics 1034a30f).


Footnotes

Footnote 1
Greek quotations, pagination and line numberings from the Metaphysics in exegetical contexts in this paper are from the Ross text.

Footnote 2
Owens, The Doctrine of Being etc., pp. 126135.

Footnote 3
Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, pp. 4334 esp. 433 B 50, 434 B 1318, 434 A 8 and 435 B 43. Bonitz' second sense of logos seems especially to the point. Cf. also De Anima 412b10f, 415b14.

Footnote 4
cf. Bonitz, loc. cit.

Footnote 5
Also cf. the Ross text of the Metaphysics, v. 1, p. cxli.



BIBLIOGRAPHY


Books

Albert of Saxony. Commentarius in Posteriora Aristotelis. (1497) Incunabulum, Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendruck no. 798. Original in the Vatican, microfilm at Villanova University Library.

alFarabi. Short Commentary on Aristotles Prior Analytics. Translated from the original Arabic with introduction and notes by Nicholas Rescher. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963.

Anscombe, G.E.M. and P.T. Geach. Three Philosophers. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961.

Apostle, Hippocrates George. Aristotles Philosophy of Mathematics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952.

Aristotle. Aristotelis Organaon graece. Ed. Theodorus Waitz. Lubuque, Iowa: Brown Reprint Library, 1962.

Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle. Ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, 1941.

Aristotle. Metaphysics. Translated with Commentaries and Glossary by Hippocrates G. Apostle. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1966.

Aristotle. Aristotle's Metaphysics. A revised Text witb Introduction and Commentary. Two volumes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924; Oxford University Press, 1958. W.D. Ross, ed.

Averroes. In librum V (Delta) metaphysicorum Aristotelis commentarius. Ed. Ruggero Ponzalli. Berne: Francke, 1971.

Averroes. Metaphysicorum libri XIIII cum Averois...commentariis et epitome. Venetiis, apud Iuntas, 1552. Villanova University Library, microcards.

Bonitz, Hermann. Aristotelis Metaphysica commentarius. Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1960.

Bonitz, Hermann. Index Aristotelicus. Graz: Akademische Druck und Verlagsanstalt, 1955.

Bonitz, Hermann. Ueber die Kategorien des Aristoteles. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967.

Calogero, Guido. I Fondamenti della Logica Aristotelica. Florence: Le Nonnier, 1927.

Cherniss, Harold Fredrik. Aristotles Criticism of Plato and the Academy. New York City: Russell and Russell, 1962.

Gohlke, Paul Hermann Eduard. Die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik. Berlin: Junker and Duennhaupt, 1936.

Hart, Charles A. Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1959.

Howell, Wilbur Samuel. Eighteenth Century British Logic and Rhetoric. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Jaeger, Werner Wilhelm. Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development. Translated by R. Robinson. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948.

John of St. Thomas. The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas: Basic Treatises. Trans. Y.R. Simon et al. Preface by Jacques Maritain. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.

LaRamee, Pierre De. Dialectique (1555). Critical edition by Michel Dassonville. Geneva: Droz, 1964.

Larkin, Miriam Therese. Language in the Philosophy of Aristotle. The Hague: Mouton, 1971.

Leblond, Jean Marie. Logique et Methode chez Aristote. Etude sur la Recherche des Principes dans la Physique Aristotelicienne. Paris: Vrin, 1939.

Leszl, Walter. Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle. Aristotle's treatment of types of equivocity and its relevance to his metaphysical theories. Padua: Antenore, 1970.

Lukasiewicz, Jan. Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic. Second Edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957.

McCall, Storrs. Aristotle's Modal Syllogisms. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1963.

Maier, Heinrich. Syllogistik des Aristoteles. 3 vol. Tuebingen: H. Lamp, 18961900. Neudruck, Leipzig: Koehler, 1936.

Mann, Jesse Aloysius. Existential Import and the Aristotelian Syllogistic. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1958.

Mansion, Suzanne. Le Jugenient d'Existence chez Aristote. Louvain (Instit. Super. de Philosophie) and Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1946.

Mill, John Stuart. A System of Logic. London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911.

Moravcsik, J.M.E. Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books (Doubleday), 1967.

Muskens, Georgius Laurentius. De Vocis ANALOGIAS significatione ac usu apud Aristotelem. Groningen: J.B. Wolters, 1943.

Owens, Joseph. The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. Third Edition, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1978.

Patzig, Guenther. Aristotles Theory of the Syllogism. A Logico-philological Study of Book A of the Prior Analytics. Trans. Jonathan Barnes. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969.

Prantl, Carl von. Ueber die Entwicklung der Aristotelischen Logik aus der Platonischen Philosophie. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968.

Prior, Arthur N. The Doctrine of Propositions and Terms. Eds. P.T. Geach and A.J.P. Kenny. London: Duckworth, 1976.

Rose, Lynn E. Aristotle's Syllogistic. Springfield, Illinois: Thomas, 1968.

Scotus, John Duns. Lectura super quaestiones universales Scoti. Venice: Simone of Lovere, Andreas Torresanus, 20 March 1500. Microcopy in Villanova University Library. Original in the Vatican.

Shute, Richard. On the History of the Process by which the Aristotelian Writings Arrived at their Present Form. New York City: Arno Press, 1976.

Smeets, Albert. Act en Potentie in de Metaphysica van Aristoteles. Historischphilologisch Onderzoek van Boek 9 en Boek 5 der Metaphysica. Louvain: Leuvense Universitaire Uitgaven, 1952. In series Recueil de Travaux d'Histoire et de Philologie, ser. 3, no. 49.

Solmsen, Friedrich. Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik. Berlin: Weidmann, 1929.

Sorabji, Richard. Aristotle on Memory. Providence, RI: Brown University Press, 1972.

Taylor, Alfred Edward. Aristotle. Revised Edition. New York City: Dover, 1956.

Thomas Aquinas, Saint. Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Trans. J.P. Lowan. Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1961.

Thomas Aquinas, Saint. Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle. Trans. F.R. Larcher, Preface by James A. Weisheipl. Albany, NY: Magi Books, 1970.

Thomas Aquinas, Saint. The 'Summa Theo1ogica' of St. Thomas Aquinas. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, Ltd., 1921. Also New York: Benziger Brothers, 1921.

Thomas Aquinas, Saint. Tractati de logica, de physica et de metaphysica. n.tp. 3 vol. Ms of late 18th Century, Latin. Located in the University of Pennsylvania Library, Penniman Collection.

Trendelenburg, Friedrich Adolph. Elementa Logices Aristotelicae. Seventh Edition, Berlin: Weber, 1874.

Trendelenburg, Friedrich Adolph. Logische Untersuchungen. Two vol. Third edition. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1870.

Treptow, Elmar. Der Zusammenhang Zwischen der Metaphysik und der zweiten Analytik Aristoteles. Munich & Salzburg: Pustet, 1966.

Veatch, Henry B. Two Logics: The Conflict Between Classical and Neo-Analytic Philosophy. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969.

Vuillemin, Jules. De la logique a la theologie, cinq etudes sur Aristote. Paris: Flammarion, 1967.

Zelle, Friedrich. Der Unterschied in der Auffassung der Logik bei Aristoteles und bei Kant. Berlin: W. Weber, 1870.



Articles


Addis, Laird. "Aristotle and the Independence of Substances." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 33 (1972) 107111.

Allen, Reginald E. "Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues." Philosophy Review, 69 (1960) 14764.

Amaral, P., and J. Allison. "Aristotle's Metaphysics 13.10 1086b 3237." Classical Philology, 70 (1975) 1213.

Anton, John P. "On Aristotle's Principle of Contradiction: Its Ontological Foundations and Platonic Antecedents." Philosophia (Athens), (1972) 266280.

"Aristotle and the Principle of Contradiction as a Law of Thought." n.a. Personalist, 56 (1975) 40313.

Barnes, Jonathan. "The Law of Contradiction." Philosophical Quarterly, 19 (1969) 3029.

Barth, Timotheus. "Das Problem der Vieldeutigkeit bei Aristoteles." Sophia, 10 (1942) 1130.

Bennekom, R. van. "Definitions of sundesmos and arthron in Aristotle, Poetics chapter 20." Mnemosyne 28 fasc. 4 (1975) 399411.

Berry, Kenneth K. "The Relation of the Aristotelian Categories to the Logic and Metaphysics." New Scholasticism, 14 (1940) 40611.

Bird, 0. "Tradition of the Logical Topics: Aristotle to Ockham." Journal of the History of Ideas, 23 (1962) 30710.

Blumenthal, H.J. "Aristotle Metaphysics Gamma, 5, 1010b2." Mnemosyne, 32 fasc 1/2 (1979) 1656.

Bolton, R. "Essentialism and Semantic Theory in Aristotle: Posterior Analytics II, 710." Philosophy Review 85 (1976) 51444.

Bonitz, Hermann. "Ueber die Categorien Aristotelis." Sitzb. Wien Akad., 10 (1853) 591645.

Booth, N.B. "Assumptions Involved in the Third Man Argument." Phronesis, 3 (1958) 1469.

Brogan, A.P. "Modality and Quantification in Aristotle." Mind, 82 (1973) 1234.

Chu, FengChieh. "On the Law of Identity." Chinese Studies in Philosophy, 1 (1970) 108143.

Cohen, S.M. "Essentialism in Aristotle." Review of Metaphysics, 31 (1978) 387405.

Conway, James I. "The Meaning of Moderate Realism." New Scholasticism, 36 (1962) 14179.

Corcoran, John. "Aristotelian Syllogisms: Valid Arguments or True Universalized Conditionals?" Mind, 83 (1974) 27881.

Corcoran, John. "Completeness of an Ancient Logic." Journal of Symbolic Logic, 37 (1972) 696702.

Corcoran, John. "A Mathematical Model of Aristotle's Syllogistic." Archiv Fuer Geschichte der Philosophie, 55 (1973) 191219.

Dodds, Eric Robertson. "The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One.'" Classical Quarterly, 22 (1928) 12942.

Donaldson, James. "Essential Predication and the Syllogism: J.S. Mill and Aristotle." Laval Theologique et Philosophique, 31 (1975) 193205.

Duerlinger, J. "Syllogismos and syllogizesthai in Aristotle's Organon." American Journal of Philology, 9U (1969) 3208.

Edel, Abraham. "Aristotle's Categories and the Nature of Categorial Theory." Review of Metaphysics, 29 (1975) 4565.

Englebretsen, George. "On Propositional Form." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 21 (1980) 101l10.

Englebretsen, George. "Singular Terms and the Syllogistic." New Scholasticism, 54 (1980) 6874.

Engmann, J. "Aristotelian Universals." Classical Philology, 73 (1978) 1723.

Geach, Peter T. "The Third Nan Again." Philosophy Review, 65 (1956) 7282.

Ghose, A. "Singular Propositions and Aristotle's Conception of Logic." International Philosophy Quarterly, 15 (1975) 32731.

Gillespie, Charles Melville. "The Aristotelian Categories." Classical Quarterly, 19 (1925) 7584.

Granger, Herbert. "Aristotle and the GenusSpecies Relation." Southern Journal of Philosophy, 18 (1980) 3750.

Gyekye, K. "Aristotelian Language and Meaning." International Philosophical Quarterly, 14 (1974) 717.

Hadgopoulos, D.J. "Substitution of Variables in Aristotle." Journal of the History of Philosophy, 13 (1975) 1338.

Harvey, P. "Aristotle on Truth and Falsity in De Anima 3.6." Journal of the History of Philosophy, 16 (1978) 21920.

Hirschberger, Johannes. "Paronymie und Analogie bei Aristoteles." Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 68 (1959) 191203.

Jacobs, William. "The Existential Presuppositions of Aristotle's Logic." Philosophical Studies, 37 (1980) 419428.

Kirwan, C. "Aristotle and the socalled fallacy of equivocation." Philosophical Quarterly, 29 (1979) 3546.

Lear, J. "Aristotle's Compactness Proof." Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979) 198215.

Leszl, Walter. "Knowledge of the Universal and Knowledge of the Particular in Aristotle." Review of Metaphysics, 26 (1972) 278313.

Lonux, M.J. "Form, Species and Predication in Metaphysics Z, H and Theta." Mind, 88 (1979) 123.

Lukasiewicz, Jan. "On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle." Tr. V. Wedin. Review of Metaphysics, 24 (1971) 485509.

Mansion, Suzanne. "'Plus Connu En Soi', 'Plus Connu Pour Nous': Une Distinction Epistemologique Importante Chez Aristote." Pensamiento, 35 (1979) 16170.

Merlan, P. "to ti een einai." Classical Philology, 61 (1966) 188.

Modrak, D.K. "Forms, Types and Tokens in Aristotle's Metaphysics." Journal of the History of Philosophy, 17 (1979) 37181.

Moravcsik, J.M.E. "Aristotle on Predication." Philosophical Review, 76 (1967) 8096; erratum 76 (1967) 543.

Noica, C. "Reflexions Sur LExegese Grecque Et La Logique Contemporaine." Philosophie et Logique, 19 (1975) 1316.

OFarrell, Francis. "Aristotle's, Kant's and Hegel's Logic." Parts One and Two in, respectively, Gregorianum, 54 (1973) 477516 and 655677.

Owen, G.E.L. "Logic and Metaphysics in some Earlier Works of Aristotle." In: Duering and Owen, Eds., Aristotle and Plato in the MidFourth Century, Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum held at Oxford in August, 1957. Goeteborg: Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia, 11 (1960) 13344.

Owens, Joseph. "Matter and Predication in Aristotle." In: Moravcsik, J.M.E., Aristotle; A Collection of Critical Essays. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967.

Owens, Joseph. "Aristotle on Categories." Review of Metaphysics, 14 (1960) 7390.

Owens, Joseph. "Reality and Metaphysics." Review of Metaphysics, 25 (1972) 63858.

Owens, Joseph. "Recent Footnotes to Plato." Review of Metaphysics, 20 (1967) 64861.

Philippe, M.D. "La Participation d'apres Aristote." Revue Thomiste, 49 (1949) 25477.

Prantl, Carl. "Ueber die Entwicklung der Aristotelischen Logik aus der Platonischen Philosophie." Abh. Bayr. Akad., 7 (1853) 129211.

Qadir, C.A. "Early Islamic Critic of Aristotelian Logic: Ibn Taimiyyah." International Philosophical Quarterly, 8 (1968) 498512.

Rasmussen, Douglas B. "Aristotle and the Defense of the Law of Contradiction." The Personalist, 54 (1973) 14962.

Reck, Andrew J. "Aristotle's Concept of Substance in the Logical Writings." Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1972) 715.

Rescher, Nicholas and Z. Parks. "New Approach to Aristotle's Apodeictic Syllogisms." Review of Metaphysics, 24 (1971) 67889.

Rohr, M.D. "Aristotle on the Transitivity of being said of." Journal of the History of Philosophy, 16 (1978) 37985.

Sellars, Wilfrid. "Substance and Form in Aristotle." Journal of Philosophy, 54 (1957) 68889; correction 55 (1958) 220.

Sellars, Wilfrid. "Vlastos and 'The Third Man'". Philosophical Review, 64 (1955) 40537.

Sisson, E.O. "The Copula in Aristotle and Afterwards." Philosophical Review, 48 (1939) 5764.

Stocks, John Leofric. "The Composition of Aristotle's Logical Works." Classical Quarterly, 27 (1933) 11524.

Sykes, R.D. "Form in Aristotle: Universal or Particular?" Philosophy, 50 (1975) 31131.

Taran, L. "Aristotle's Metaphysics Z, 2, 1028 b 1319." Mnemosyne, 32 fasc. 1/2 (1979) 16770.

Veatch, H.B. "A Modest Word in Defense of Aristotle's Logic." Monist, 52 (1968) 210228.

Vlastos, Gregory. "Addenda to the Third Man Argument: A Reply to Prof. Sellars." Philosophical Review, 64 (1955) 43848.

Vlastos, Gregory. "Postscript to the Third Man: A Reply to Mr. Geach." Philosophical Review, 65 (1956) 8394.

Vlastos, Gregory. "The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides." Philosophical Review, 63 (1954) 31949.

Weidemann, Hermann. "In Defense of Aristotle's Theory of Predication." Phronesis, 25 (1980) 7687.

Weisheipl, James A. "Thomas' Evaluation of Plato and Aristotle." New Scholasticism, 48 (1974) 100124.


Bibliographies


Philippe, Marie Dominique. Aristoteles. Berne: A. Francke, 1948.

Schwab, Moise. Bibliographie d'Aristote. Paris: H. Welter, 1896.



Text Copyright (C) 2001 by David C. Hewins. Permission is hereby granted to quote small (1-2 KB) sections of this text in scholarly or internet discussions. This text may be downloaded for noncommercial use only.